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DISCOVERING RUSSIA
Padma Desai
ow can one discover a country which is in the 
process of discovering itself?
My complicated journey to unravel this riddle 
started with a fitful adolescent resolve of wanting to read 
Dostoevsky in Russian. That rash impulse, however, 
seemed to disqualify me for the larger undertaking of 
understanding Russia in the view of most Russians I have 
known over the years. “Why Russia?” asked the young 
secretary of Oleg Vyugin, the former Deputy Chairman 
of the Central Bank of Russia, as she accompanied me 
in a Mercedes to the imposing office of her boss whom 
I interviewed for a book project in 2003. “Because of 
Dostoevsky,” I ventured. “But he is so disturbing,” she 
said, raising her voice.” That is exactly why,” I remember 
saying. What was the point of venturing into a scholarly 
endeavor devoid of challenges?
Adam Ulam, the distinguished Harvard historian of 
the former Soviet Union, once remarked that he chose 
to study the Soviet Union rather than the British Empire 
because he wanted to deal with an expanding scene rather 
than a declining one, Britain having already lost India. 
History can occasionally prove tricky when it comes to 
choosing one's area of expertise. Both Adam and I lost 
the Soviet Union along the way but Russia has continued 
to engage me.
Having trained as an economist, I opted to study 
the Soviet Union by deliberately dropping India as 
an academic pursuit. My teenage fascination with the 
English translations of Russian literature had also led 
me to study the language from my Harvard days as a 
graduate student in the Economics Department in the late 
1950s. Besides, Wassily Leontief's input-output model 
was one of the pioneering empirical exercises of those 
days. I chose to apply it to Indian data by separating 
consumption spending from the final bill of goods and 
introducing it endogenously in the application. The 
article “A Short-Term Planning Model for the Indian 
Economy” was published in the Review of Economics 
and Statistics (June 1961) in what turned out to be my 
earliest publication in a professional journal, and I felt 
adequately prepared to deal with the challenges of the 
Soviet planned system.
I visited the Soviet Union for the first time in the 
summer of 1964, lived for the most part in the Indian 
consulate in Odessa, traveled, and gathered firsthand 
impressions of Soviet arrangements. In the tsarist days, 
Odessa was known as the “Pearl of Russia” and as “Little 
Paris.” During my stay under Soviet rule, it appeared 
morose and preoccupied as if it was in permanent
mourning. The French and Italian cafes of its cultural 
heyday, which I imagined Pushkin and Tolstoy had 
visited during their stay, had disappeared. When Mark 
Twain passed through Odessa in 1869, he wrote: “We saw 
only America. There was not one thing to remind us that 
we were in Russia.”
I, on the other hand, realized that I was in the Soviet 
Union. I remember the perennial lines in front of the 
stores, combined with exquisite orderliness. Beyond 
orderliness, I noticed pervasive fear. I also sampled from 
visiting Indian students to the consulate that exceptional 
brand of Russian humor which imparts an impeccable 
intellectual touch to a current event or some aspect of the 
country's political reality. During my stay, Khrushchev 
was still the leader and Valentina Tereshkova, the first 
woman astronaut, happened to return from outer space. 
This most exciting event in early Soviet space history 
brought momentary jubilation on Soviet TV and creative 
fervor among humorists of the day. In one joke, titled 
Khrushchev's Dilemma, the Soviet leader discovers that 
Valentina returns home pregnant. He had to either accept 
the Biblical notion of Immaculate Conception or the 
alternative that an American astronaut had encountered 
Valentina in outer space.
While I began my discovery of Russia with love for 
Russian literature and humor, I have deliberately avoided 
converting it into a sentimental journey. From early on, I 
had decided to handle Soviet and Russian policy issues 
rigorously and empirically by applying appropriate 
models to the available data and tracking the model 
results with the help of the fast advancing computational 
procedures.
Four Decades of Empirical Modeling:
From the Post-War Economic Growth
Retardation to the Current Financial Crisis
From the perspective of more than four decades, the 
problems I posed, the empirical models I adopted, and 
the computer packages I employed may appear primitive, 
but they were the exciting scholarly endeavors of the 
moment calling for answers. Which production function 
specification would accurately capture Soviet growth 
retardation which began from 1950? What contribution, 
if any, did total factor productivity make to the growth 
process? These inquiries, which were being sorted out for 
the U.S. economy, awaited the models and the empirical 
exercises which were applied for the very first time to 
the Soviet case. And I wanted to move further. Suppose 
the Soviet planned economy had worked according to
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the rules of the American free market system, how much 
more productive would it have been? If the gains turned 
out to be significant, one could make a solid case against 
Stalin's adoption of the Marxist-Leninist system.
With Mikhail Gorbachev's appearance in March 
1985 as Soviet leader, the changing Soviet scene created 
new research opportunities for me. I analyzed the design 
and dilemmas of his perestroika reforms even as they 
were unfolding in Perestroika in Perspective (Princeton 
University Press, 1989). I also sought to figure out the 
impact of Gorbachev's very limited liberalization policies 
in Soviet agriculture. Would the opportunity which he 
gave to collective farm households for retaining their
earnings raise farm productivity in terms of per acre grain 
yield? Would the new contract system, which assigned 
a piece of land to the farm household and linked its 
earnings to its contribution to the collective farm output, 
create incentives in Soviet agriculture? But then it would 
be necessary to separate the impact of weather from yield 
variability. That was a formidable challenge. The arable 
land constituted only 7.17 percent of Russia's enormous 
territory of 6,387,319 square miles. However, the high 
latitude and the extreme continentality of an eleven 
time zone land mass with severe winters, short growing 
seasons and fluctuating temperatures complicated my 
task of selecting a representative sample and constructing 
appropriate weather variables.
When Boris Yeltsin and his band of reformers, led 
by his young prime minister, the late Yegor Gaidar, 
began liberalizing prices and privatizing assets in early 
1992, the process unsettled enterprise prices, costs and 
revenues on a massive scale. Millions of workers in 
privatized industry and the state sector (which failed 
to receive tax revenues from failing businesses) were 
deprived of wages and pensions from 1994 to 1998. My 
coauthor Todd Idson and I employed the multivariate 
maximum likelihood probit estimation for assessing the 
partial impact of specific attributes which affected the 
likelihood of the sample employee's experience of wage 
denial. Among these attributes were the respondent's 
residence, occupation, education, and gender. We used 
a substantial household data set for answering these 
questions.
But the Russian economy was set to revive. Under 
Vladimir Putin's two-term presidency from 2000 to 
mid-2008, it registered an annual real GDP growth of 7 
percent, the result of high oil prices which hit an eye-
popping $147 a barrel in July 2008. The impressive 
growth did collapse toward the end of 2008 when the 
global financial crisis hit Russia as oil prices tumbled 
to $30 a barrel. Foreign portfolio investors fled from
2
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
Russia. The ruble declined sharply. Rather than restrict 
my analysis to the crisis impact on the Russian economy, 
I began formulating a computable model with data 
for about 60 countries. The model will estimate the 
impact of the crisis in 2009 and the recovery prospects 
in 2010 for the sample, both in terms of GDP growth 
rates. The explanatory variables will consist of sample 
country export dependence; banking sector balance sheet 
health; pre-crisis budget situation; and inflation rate 
during crisis onset which would inhibit policy makers' 
stimulus adoption capability. Russia, it would seem, had 
everything going against it in terms of these variables.
During the Soviet investigative phase, I encountered 
massive data problems. “Where do you get your data 
from?” was the routine question I faced.
Where Was the Data?
Official data began to be available in a sustained 
fashion only after the Second World War—more precisely, 
after Stalin's death in 1953. The first Soviet statistical 
yearbook was published in 1956, an event of momentous 
excitement. Indeed, some of the most valuable work in 
the field consisted in generating data. While Soviet data 
were of recent origin, they were also plagued with gaps 
here and there. The size of the statistical yearbook waxed 
and waned with the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. The 
detente-phase yearbooks were opulent in contrast to their 
lean condition during bilateral tensions. Information 
was arbitrarily held back with the result that obtaining 
a 30-year time series was an improbable event. And in 
the view of diehard practitioners, 30 observations are not 
enough for rigorous econometric application.
Even when long time series were available as with 
Soviet weather data for my grain yield project, one had 
only the basic information on monthly temperature and 
precipitation for use as weather variables in the weather- 
yield models. “The author should use soil moisture 
indexes instead because they are more appropriate” was 
the journal referee's blunt response. But where could I 
get the detailed information on soil types, their moisture 
retention capacities at various depths and the like for this 
purpose?
In short, micro data on outputs and inputs at the firm 
or farm level were absent. This contrasted sharply with 
the ready-to-use availability of time series and cross 
section information, quite often on computer discs, to 
researchers who worked on problems of the American 
economy.
Equally serious were the methodological problems 
associated with the information that was available. These 
went beyond the familiar distinction between the Marxist 
Net Material Product (which omitted the contribution 
of the service sector) and the market-economy Gross 
National Product. Again, Soviet output data were reported 
in official sources by sectors of the economy in annual 
growth rates only. They were also known to include raw 
material usage by a sector to the exclusion of the market 
economy value added procedure. Nor were they estimated 
in constant prices. In my production function estimation
project, the methodological soundness of the output and 
input data was critical. Of immense value for this purpose 
were the Central Intelligence Agency's successive 
rounds of estimates of outputs at the economy, industry 
and industrial branch levels in terms of the standard 
market economy practice. I developed alternative output 
series in two articles published in the Bulletin of the 
Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics (summer 
1973, February 1978) with the intention of correcting the 
inadequacy. It was not possible to convert Soviet capital 
stock data, which were inflated, despite official claims 
to the contrary, into a constant price series. A suitable 
price deflator did not exist. Nor was it possible to derive 
a measure of capacity utilization.
Given these problems, I could discard the econometric 
box of tools, tell stories, and become a free-wheeling 
policy wonk or apply these tools with a mixture of 
optimism, curiosity and caution, optimism regarding the 
applicability of these tools to Soviet problems, curiosity 
about the results that emerged, and caution about how 
sound they were. I chose the latter route in my scientific 
work.
So I began studying the Soviet planned economy in 
depth in 1968 when I returned to Harvard as a Research 
Associate at the Russian Research Center, continuing 
it after I had moved to Columbia University in 1980 as 
Professor in the Economics Department. My earliest 
research focused on using the detailed production 
function estimates for measuring the loss experienced 
by the Soviet planned economy from 1955 to 1975 as a 
result of its departure from market economy practices.
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How Costly Was the Marxist-Leninist
System? : Measurement Issues
The features of the planned system were implanted via 
a succession of five-year plans which began with Stalin's 
massive industrialization drive of the 1930s. Labor was 
sucked in at a dizzying speed from the countryside and 
employed in factories at fixed wages. Managers sought 
to fulfill output targets (handed down by the planners) 
and sold their products at fixed prices. They also lacked 
the Schumpeterian drive to innovate. Except in the 
military and isolated industries, the Brezhnev-era (1965-
82) record was devoid of innovative breakthroughs. The 
inevitable consequences of the rigid institutional setup 
were shortages and bottlenecks, retarded innovation and 
faltering growth. The pervasive shortages gave a bizarre 
flavor to the daily life of the people. “The whole country 
is covered with blast furnaces,” an exasperated Russian 
friend told David Shipler of the New York Times, “but I 
can't get a table knife.” In sum, the overpowering signs 
and signals of the drab, regimented Orwellian reality 
were everywhere prompting me to recall a wry witticism: 
Religion comforts the masses by assuring them that there 
is life after death, whereas Communism does so by 
assuring them that there is death after life.
The Soviet output growth record during the 
immediate postwar period until 1955 for the economy 
and for specific sectors such as industry and agriculture 
was solid. However, output growth began to decline 
from the mid-fifties in comparison with that in most
other countries. The growth was fueled primarily by 
high saving and investment rates. As labor shortages 
developed, the strategy of massive substitution of capital 
for labor could not be relied for long to propel vigorous 
future growth. Instead, the Soviet planners would be 
increasingly forced to rely on technological progress that 
had propelled growth in several capitalist economies with 
a lower saving rate. One would assume that the switch 
from an intensive growth regime marked by diminishing 
returns associated with a high capital to labor ratio did 
not come soon. The system was much better at amassing 
resources for large-scale accumulation than at the risk 
taking and innovative, decentralized, rate-of-return 
approach that was required.
These subjects such as technical change and 
allocative efficiency in the Soviet economy represented 
a new trend in Soviet economics. I was keen to depart 
from the institutional thrust of much of the preceding 
work and bring the discipline of Sovietology into 
the fold of mainstream economics. Why not estimate 
different specifications of the production function, also 
with alternative definitions of technical change, and 
pick up one which “best” defined Soviet production 
activity? My earliest paper dealing with alternative 
production function formulations, titled “The Production 
Function and Technical Change in Postwar Soviet 
Industry: A Reexamination,” was published in the 
American Economic Review (June 1976). By the mid- 
1970s, foreign capital had begun trickling in the Soviet 
economy. Could it give a much needed push for easing 
the growth retardation under Brezhnev? My paper 
on “The Productivity of Foreign Resource Inflow to
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the Soviet Economy” was published in the American 
Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings, May 1979).
When econometric estimates of production functions 
and the observed allocation of labor and capital in different 
sectors of the Soviet economy suggested that resources 
were misallocated among sectors, how should one 
measure the implied loss? What could be the appropriate 
measures of such misallocation losses? I assumed that 
the actual situation was characterized by the absence of 
equality between the marginal rates of substitution of 
factors of production in different industrial branches. 
When marginal rates were equalized, the reallocation of 
factors led to more output from the same factor use or 
less factor use for the same output. I then analyzed the 
measurement issues first with reference to the output loss 
resulting for the suboptimal utilization of given factors 
and then extended the analysis to include measures 
of factor saving when the same basket of outputs was 
produced with less factor utilization. I used econometric 
estimates of production functions in industry branches 
to reach estimates of the loss arising from inter-branch 
misallocation of capital and labor deployed in Soviet 
industry. This loss turned out to be non-negligible, 
ranging from a low of about 3 to 4 percent to a high of 
10 percent of efficient factor use and rising over time. 
The result suggested a measure of recent decline in 
Soviet industrial and overall growth from 1955 to 1975. 
My paper (jointly with Ricardo Martin) titled “The 
Efficiency Loss from Resource Misallocation in Soviet 
Industry,” covering the analytical approach and the 
empirical results, was published in the Quarterly Journal 
of Economics (August 1983). The research project was 
financed by a two-year grant from the National Science 
Foundation.
My next exercise related to the importance of 
weather and input contribution in Soviet per acre grain 
yield performance.
Weather Variables versus Input Use,
Grain Yield, and Grain Imports
Prevailing opinion on the subject was divided with 
some experts underlining the role of weather and others 
emphasizing the impact of “systemic” factors. Among 
the latter were the lack of market type incentives and 
decentralized decision making that pervaded the Soviet 
economy, including farming. Policy factors such as 
the decision to promote fertilizer use by increasing its 
supplies and application or raising the relative spring 
grain acreage would also influence yield. It was clear 
that the impact of “systemic” and policy factors on yield 
could not be assessed unless the weather component was 
separated from yield.
I selected 14 oblasts (provinces) which represented 
the climate, soil and vegetation of the Soviet grain belt. 
The oblast was the basic unit of analysis because it was 
the smallest unit for which sustained time series data 
of grain yield were available. (Indeed, although they 
were small, the oblast sizes in the East European grain
growing region varied from 21,350 sq. miles for Pskov 
oblast to 2,18,040 sq. miles for Samara oblast. Even after 
the collective farm reorganization under Putin, Russian 
farm size averages 12,500 acres, much larger than a U.S. 
farm on average.) I regressed per acre grain yield in each 
oblast from 1950 to 1975 on an input component and a 
weather variability component. The input component 
measured the contribution to yield of the time trend and 
average weather variables of the oblast crop cycle (The 
time trend was assumed to represent input use.) The 
weather variability component measured the variability 
of oblast yield attributable to the deviation of actual 
weather from mean weather. I then derived an aggregate 
equation by regressing actual Soviet grain yield from 
1958 to 1975 on the oblast yields derived from the 
weather yield models and weighted by the relative 
oblast acreage. As with oblast yields, I defined weather 
variability for aggregate Soviet yield as the variability of 
yield attributable to the deviation of actual weather in a 
year from average weather.
The contribution of weather fluctuations to aggregate 
Soviet yield variance (explained by the covariance ratio) 
was 52 percent with input variation accounting for the 
remaining 48 percent. It turned out that the contribution 
of weather fluctuations to per acre yield variance 
(explained by the aggregate model) was only slightly 
larger than that of input variation.
In the meantime, I noticed that Soviet grain imports 
had become substantial in relation to world grain trade 
in the early 1980s. They also tended to vary from year 
to year depending on Soviet grain and wheat outputs
in below average and above average weather. The
size and variability of these imports presented serious
5
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
implications for grain exporting and grain deficit 
countries. I employed some of my research results on 
weather related grain yield variability for predicting 
Soviet grain and wheat imports in each year in the 
early eighties. These results were published in “Soviet 
Grain and Wheat Import Demands in 1992-1985” in 
the American Journal of Agricultural Economics (May 
1982). Another paper, “Reforming the Soviet Grain 
Economy: Performance, Problems and Solutions,” was 
published in the American Economic Review (Papers 
and Proceedings, May 1992). The research on the Soviet 
grain economy during the early eighties was financed by 
two grants from the International Food Policy Research 
Institute in Washington, D.C. and by the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization.
The articles relating to my continuing research on the 
allocative efficiency of the Soviet planned economy along 
with several others on Soviet trade and aid connections 
with Soviet bloc and developing countries were brought 
out by Basil Blackwell in 1987 in a volume titled The 
Soviet Economy: Problems and Prospects.
My next project (jointly with my former Columbia 
colleague Todd Idson) related to an analysis of the 
exceptional and extensive wage nonpayment from 1994 
to 1998 under Yeltsin during which wage and pension 
payments were either withheld or reduced for millions 
of Russians.
From “Wages without Work” to
“Work without Wages”
The seventy-year old Soviet tradition of “wages 
without work” turned all too soon into “work without 
wages” as the Stalinist planned economy began switching 
to a market system in 1992. The lack of budget discipline 
surrounding unrealistic budgets, combined with the 
breakdown of contractual obligations at all levels, and 
the failure of state agencies to enforce business laws led 
to pervasive wage nonpayment to workers in the budget 
sector and in privatized industry. Outright worker layoffs 
associated with cash flow problems as during the current 
U.S. recession were avoided. Bankruptcy enforcement 
was slowed.
Our data originated from the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS) project of the Carolina 
Population Center (CPC) at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, financed by the United States 
Agency for International Development. The data 
contained detailed information on demographic and 
employment characteristics by occupation and job 
location of working men and women which helped us 
analyze their labor market experience. The surveys 
covering 2,000 to 4,000 households at a time helped 
us answer a variety of questions from the interviewees' 
responses. For example, how did employers decide 
which workers to deny wages? To what extent? How 
frequently? Were women denied wages more frequently 
than men? Did workers fall below the poverty line as a 
result? What were their survival strategies? For example, 
did they borrow from family members? Did increasing 
wage arrears lead to widespread strikes? On the other 
hand, did strikes lead to lower wage arrears? Which way 
did the causation run?
We analyzed nonpayment patterns across demographic 
groups defined by gender, age, and education, and in 
various occupations, industries, and regions of Russia. 
Having avoided bankruptcies and substantial worker 
layoffs, Russia's Soviet-era managers resorted to wage 
nonpayment and barter as survival mechanisms. We 
concluded that, having opted for wage withholding rather 
than explicit contract renegotiations, managers withheld 
wages more frequently and in larger amounts and for 
longer periods for the relatively low-paid workers. We 
also found that women with similar demographic and 
job market attributes as men were more likely to be 
subjected to wage nonpayment. The prevalence of barter 
among enterprises and among employers and workers, 
seemed to have been exaggerated. Despite mounting 
anecdotal evidence, although employers did pay workers 
in goods, the payments, according to our analysis, were 
insufficient to counter the adverse impact of accumulated 
wage nonpayment.
Did wage denial push people below the poverty 
line, defined in terms of a minimum living standard? 
How did families survive when they were denied wages 
for months at a time? Indeed, wage denial increased 
the likelihood of families falling into poverty. Russian
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families engaged in a variety of survival strategies to 
compensate for nonpayment by undertaking informal 
paid activity, selling family assets, engaging in home 
production for consumption and sale, and receiving cash 
from relatives.
Did strikes lead to reduced wage arrears? Workers' 
recourse to laws for extracting back wages was 
ineffective, and strikes were largely uncoordinated over 
time and territory. Our statistical results showed that 
although wage arrears led to increased strike activity, 
strikes did not result in a lowering of wage arrears.
Our research was supported by partial funding from 
the Harriman Institute of Columbia University, and the 
results were published in Work without Wages: Russia's 
Nonpayment Crisis by the MIT Press in 2000.
The Russian economy, however, began reviving from 
2000, its GDP registering an annual real growth rate of 7 
percent until mid-2008. The high growth, which resulted 
from rising oil prices during the period, raised the issue of 
the possible occurrence of the Dutch Disease in Russia.
Did the Economy Experience a Dutch
Disease from 2000 to 2007?
Did the real appreciation of the ruble, brought on 
by a strong economy and growing investment flows 
into Russia, damage its manufacturing sector exports 
as a symptom of the Dutch Disease? Next, did the 
escalating taxation of the booming oil sector profits 
create a disincentive for investment in the economy 
and its growth? Was this impact negative suggesting a
CONVERSATIONS ON
RUSSIA
fiscal drag? I applied the Vector Auto-Regression models 
to the available quarterly data from 1999 to 2005 for 
analyzing these two issues. My result was inconclusive 
with respect to the impact of the Dutch-Disease-related 
ruble appreciation on Russia's manufacturing sector. 
Its performance was evidently troubled by problems 
within the sector itself reflecting its rigid, limited pro-
market environment. The answer to the second question 
suggested a fiscal drag resulting from the government 
sucking investment resources from private oil 
companies. In other words, the escalating taxation of the 
oil sector had adverse effects on investment and growth 
in the economy. The results were published in my paper 
titled “Why Is Russian GDP Growth Slowing?” in the 
American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings, 
May 2006).
My continuing research relating to various aspects 
of Russia's transformation from its Communist past 
required frequent visits to Moscow and close contacts 
with policymakers at the highest level. In 2000, I 
started a project of interviews with leading Russian and 
American policymakers and with prominent analysts 
who commented on that process as it transpired with 
unprecedented consequences under Yeltsin's leadership. 
The project, partially funded by the Harriman Institute, 
turned out to be a challenging enterprise requiring a firm 
grasp on my part of the unfolding scene in Russia and of its 
complicated past. Fortunately, my scholarly engagement 
of over three decades with the Soviet experience and 
subsequently with the tumultuous events in Russia 
under Gorbachev and Yeltsin provided me with the 
necessary background. My book-length studies, articles 
in professional journals, and frequent commentaries in 
the press and the media came in handy for the task at 
hand. Overall my conversations went beyond economic 
issues to discuss Russian foreign policy, history, society, 
and demography. The interviewees livened up their 
responses with interesting anecdotes, historical and 
literary references, and revealing stories. The resulting 
book Conversations on Russia: Reform from Yeltsin to 
Putin (Oxford University Press, 2006) was selected by 
the Financial Times as a “pick of 2006.”
Conversations on Reform
from Yeltsin to Putin
The evolution of Russian reform started with Yeltsin's 
colorful and remarkable appearance on the Russian scene 
as president in 1992 and ended with Putin's orderly but 
disquieting consolidation of federal authority starting 
in 2000. In his interview, published in Conversations, 
Yeltsin referred to his young reformist collaborators as 
his “kamikaze crew.” It is incontestable that the group 
planted the liberal idea in the land of Lenin and Stalin. 
They dismantled the Communist planned economy and 
the authoritarian political arrangements that had prevailed 
over seven decades. Besides, their destructive agenda 
had a full nod of approval from the U.S. leadership. In a 
revelatory gem, Strobe Talbott, former Deputy Secretary
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of State under Bill Clinton said that the two presidents, 
Bill and Boris, had bonded. Both wanted the Communist 
planned economy and the authoritarian regime to go. 
Clinton's policy imperative was: “Yeltsin drunk is to be 
preferred to any alternative sober.”
However, while the reformers' “demolition project” 
was successful, their success did not extend to what might 
be called a balancing “creative project”: the establishment 
of institutions necessary to support a market-oriented 
economy. In my view, the reformers paid insufficient 
attention to the consequences of the reform process 
they unveiled. Their absolutist stance underemphasized 
both the need to work at getting public acceptance of 
their program and the need to countervail the adverse 
distributional implications of some of the key reforms. 
In particular, while one can understand the rationale for 
hastening privatization, their agenda of selling Russia's 
state-owned assets in the natural resources sector to the 
oligarchs was widely seen as inequitable and even as 
“outright robbery.”
As the reform team stepped into uncharted territory, 
they not only encountered Communist opposition but 
also massive difficulties in implementing their program. 
The process, involving price decontrol and cutback of 
budgetary subsidies for a variety of entitlement programs, 
imposed severe hardships on ordinary Russians. At the 
same time, Russian oligarchs captured significant assets 
in leading Russian sectors, among them oil, aluminum, 
steel and nickel. When Yeltsin abruptly resigned on 
December 25, 1999, his public approval rating had 
slumped to less than five percent. The political situation 
across the land was marked by widespread dissatisfaction, 
increased corruption and weakened federal authority.
Perhaps anticipating his resignation, Yeltsin had 
already appointed Putin as prime minister. In hindsight, 
he affirmed his choice of Putin as his successor 
because, he declares in his interview, Putin was not a 
“maximalist,” and could act as a stabilizer by reining in
the post-Yeltsin political disorder and public discontent. 
Four years later in the December 2003 parliamentary 
elections, the Russian electorate voted decisively against 
the Yeltsin-era reforms and the liberal reformist groups. 
After eight years of authoritarian governance under 
Putin, who was elected president in the spring of 2000, 
Russians continued stating their approbation of Putin in 
repeated polls by substantial majorities. They were ready 
to settle for a mild dose of authoritarianism that promised 
a return to stability, control of terrorism, and economic 
gains that they felt had eluded them for so long. The 
implicit contract with an authoritarian leader did not 
imply that the underlying situation was similar to the 
arrangements which Russians had willy-nilly undertaken 
with their leaders throughout history. At the start of the 
new millennium, Russians in large numbers had ended 
their involuntary employment with their Communist 
masters and instead found jobs of their choosing. In their 
interviews, former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov 
(who was fired from his job by President Putin in 2004) 
and former central bank chairman Sergei Dubinin 
argued that Russia and Russians had changed in several 
respects. Yegor Gaidar, who launched the reforms in 
1992, remained wary of Putin's democratic credentials 
but did not “believe in the emergence of nondemocratic 
regimes in countries with educated, urban populations” 
such as Russia's.
But the widespread betterment of living standards 
stretching over eight years was threatened when the 
global financial turmoil hit Russia toward the end of
2008. That raised new questions about the global impact 
of the crisis in 2009 and the recovery prospects for 2010 
which would differ from country to country. I analyze 
these issues at length in my new book From Financial 
Crisis to Global Recovery (Columbia University Press, 




The Financial Crisis and
Russia's Recovery Prospects
In my analysis, a crisis-afflicted country's downturn 
in 2009 and its recovery outlook in 2010 would depend 
on its continuing export dependence; its pre-crisis budget 
situation; its inflation rate at crisis onset which would 
limit its policymakers' ability to mount a government 
financed stimulus; and finally, the presence of toxic 
assets in its banking sector.
As I argue in my book, Russia was among the worst 
hit economies. Its export earnings slumped as demand 
for oil and commodities, its major exports, declined 
drastically in global markets. The positive growth rate 
of the pre-crisis years suddenly became negative in
2009. Government budget surplus turned negative in 
2009 when revenue inflows from taxes on the energy 
sector faltered. The double-digit inflation running into 
10 percent a year in 2009 constrained the government's 
ability to mount a significant stimulus. Finally, Russian 
banks found it difficult to pay back the loans they had 
acquired from hard currency creditors during the pre-
crisis years. Failing Russian businesses added to the load 
of nonperforming assets in some banks.
Indeed, this was not the first time Russian banks had 
damaged their balance sheets by reckless borrowing from 
outside. Back in 1998, the Russian economy was equally 
vulnerable to macroeconomic and financial imbalances 
as in 2008-2009, but for a different reason. On August 
17, 1998, Yeltsin's government declared a unilateral 
default on the government's ruble debt, prohibited 
commercial banks from clearing their foreign liabilities, 
and devalued the ruble from 6 rubles to a dollar to 26 
rubles. The 1997-98 financial crisis, which had spread 
from Bangkok to Brazil via Moscow, had arisen from 
massive short-term capital inflows into emerging market 
economies which were pushed by determined Washington 
policy makers, among them the IMF, and supported by 
Wall Street financiers. These inflows were short-term, 
speculative, and destabilizing. In my Financial Crisis, 
Contagion and Containment: From Asia to Argentina 
(Princeton University Press, 2003), I argued that the 
premature financial opening up by the risk-prone, return- 
savvy investors from developed market economies 
with global electronic reach had collided with the weak 
financial institutions, traditional corporate practices, and 
vulnerable political arrangements of emerging market 
economies, among them Russia. The book was noted by 
Paul Krugman as “the best book yet'' on financial crisis.
How effectively has the Russian government managed 
the recent financial crisis that unfolded toward the end 
of 2008? Which policies were implemented by decision 
makers in the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank 
of Russia for minimizing its impact? In my article 
titled “Russia's Financial Crisis: Economic Setbacks 
and Policy Responses,” published in the Journal of 
International Relations (February 2010), I argued that 
Prime Minister Putin's government managed the options 
with a noteworthy technocratic policy orientation. The
ruble was allowed to decline gradually in early 2009 
as foreign holders switched to other currencies. The 
inflation rate was brought down from a low, double-digit 
to a single-digit 6 percent by early 2010. While Russian 
banks continued to battle nonperforming loans in their 
balance sheets, the overall situation sent improving 
signals. The unemployment rate by mid-2010 had 
settled at 7 percent of the workforce. The accumulated 
foreign exchange reserves of $600 billion as well as the 
budget surpluses of the pre-crisis years provided the 
bailout resources. Even the oligarchs, who faced margin 
calls from their foreign, hard-currency creditors, were 
rescued with funds from a state bank which, however, 
acquired their stock in exchange. By a strange irony of 
circumstances, the Russian state (via the state-owned 
Vneshekonombank) regained stocks which it had given 
away to the oligarchs who had provided cash support to 
the Russian budget in 1996 and 1997.
The initial Russian bailout however was a top 
down, speedy process involving a few decision makers 
without it being subjected to independent scrutiny or 
legislative oversight or systematic winnowing of the 
turmoil victims. One looked in vain for the likes of 
Representative Barney Frank who insisted on a vigilante 
role for the U.S. lawmakers.
Beyond 2010, the Russian leadership faces the 
formidable challenge of modernizing and diversifying 
the Russian economy from excessive reliance on volatile 
exports of energy and commodities.
How Can the Russian Economy
Be Modernized and Diversified?
Apart from excessive energy export dependence, 
the Russian economy's diversification dilemmas arise 
also from the interlocking of the massive industrial 
companies in the commodities sector with large service, 
technology and trading enterprises. For example, 
Gazprom, the world's largest natural gas monopoly, 
not only supplies gas to customers inside and outside 
the country but also effectively controls the entire 
natural gas transport network. Both, in turn, with 
majority ownership of the Russian state, are effectively 
controlled in their production and pricing decisions by 
state-appointed executives. The interlocked structure 
not only prevents the emergence of robust corporate 
governance and market-based competitive decision 
making but also fosters an attitude of “legal nihilism.” 
In a striking display of forthrightness, Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev remarked on September 10, 2009: 
“Can a primitive economy, based on raw materials and 
economic corruption, lead us into the future?”
Clearly, the adoption of market-based budgetary, 
monetary and exchange rate policies by technocrats 
in the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of 
Russia helped them steer the economy through the 
initial impact of the financial crisis. But the tail of these 
policy instruments cannot wag the sprawling dog of the 
entrenched, state-controlled big business in Russia. The
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flow of foreign investment, even in a minority role, can 
help initiate the process, but venturing in Russian big 
business is an unmitigated risk. Russia's forthcoming 
entry in the World Trade Organization can also promote 
rule-based procedures in pricing and trading activities. 
But foreign investors and WTO rules can only play 
a marginal role. Ultimately, the Russian economy's 
overhaul from top down will depend on “destructive 
creation” initiatives from the leadership in Moscow.
Can the reset button announced by Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton on March 6, 2009, provide an 
external stimulus via a cooperative management of 
bilateral American-Russian relations on issues ranging 
from NATO's eastward expansion and arms control to 
nuclear nonproliferation and terrorism control? Will the 
handshake between presidents Obama and Medvedev 
on April 8, 2010, over their signing of the renewed 
START Treaty, which pledged to reduce U.S.-Russian 
stockpiles of deployed nuclear weapons, ease bilateral 
tensions further? Can a continued easing of bilateral 
tensions on foreign policy and security issues provide 
a modicum of confidence to Prime Minister Putin to 
begin liberalizing the economy if not the authoritarian 
political arrangements? From a limited perspective, can 
the process initiate investment flows from American 
business which Russia needs?
The Implications of the Reset Button
A careful review of the two-year tenure of the joint 
Putin-Medvedev governance suggests guidelines in this 
regard. Following the severe impact of the financial crisis 
on the energy-dependent Russian economy, both leaders 
have discovered a common mission for modernizing and 
diversifying the Russian economy. Indeed, they both
want a significant role for foreign direct investment for 
the purpose.
There is, however, a difference in their philosophy 
and approach. President Medvedev is a staunch believer 
in free enterprise, and talks unabashedly about what 
is wrong with Russia. On June 18, 2009, at the St. 
Petersburg International Economic Forum, he articulated 
his vision of a future Russia with total clarity: “A modern 
economy cannot be built through decrees from the top.” 
He frankly states the handicaps that Russian policy 
makers face: In his view, they battle poor governance, 
ineffective law enforcement, corruption, white collar 
crime, administrative barriers and monopolies. Prime 
Minister Putin, who is equally committed to modernizing 
Russia in measured steps, would not express either of 
these views although he is fully aware of the massive 
hurdles facing foreign investors.
The Russian economy in the view of both leaders 
needs foreign direct investment desperately. The flow 
of $70 billion in 2008 had dropped to $15.9 billion in 
2009. Even the lawmakers have recognized the need for 
safeguarding the property rights of investors. On June 
16, 2010, the lower house of the Russian parliament, 
the Duma, passed a law prescribing punishment 
for individuals who falsify official charters of legal 
businesses or results of shareholder meetings. The 
penalties are severe for those who use violence for this 
purpose. Bureaucrats who facilitate these activities will 
face a fine or lose their jobs or go to prison.
The reset button initiated by the Obama-Clinton 
team provides a solid underpinning for U.S. investors 
to step actively into Russia. They will not only provide 
the necessary technology and corporate management 
expertise but also the legal underpinning which Russian 
big business needs. The interactive relationship can
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gather speed if Prime Minister Putin reduces the 
number of strategic sectors in which foreign investment 
participation is restricted.
I am not suggesting that U.S.-led investment 
participation will initiate a process of political 
liberalization in Russia. It is difficult to predict the timing 
and manner of the demise of authoritarian regimes. The 
current signals from Moscow lack positive indications in 
that regard. Russia will hold parliamentary elections in 
2011, followed by the presidential election in 2012. The 
reformist groups in Russia have decided to combine their 
ranks and fight the parliamentary election as a single 
bloc. Will United Russia, the party which is led by Prime 
Minister Putin and which controls the Russian Duma, 
break into two groups? In a recent statement, Gorbachev 
described United Russia as “a bad copy of the Soviet 
Communist Party.” Will Putin contest the presidency 
in 2012 and remain in charge of Russia's destiny for 12 
years as the constitution allows him? That can mark a 
repeat of the economic stagnation which the Soviet 
Union experienced under Brezhnev from 1965 to 1982. 
There is, however, a difference. Brezhnev had to deal 
with the military and economic burden of the Cold War. 
The reset button will afford Putin the choice of initiating 
mini-steps of political liberalization starting with the 
election of regional governors.
The decade-long authoritarianism under Putin 
portends an uncertain political future. Given Russia's 
long history of authoritarian rule, “the poisoned challis 
of history,” the evolution of a liberal political order will 
be haphazard, perhaps even hazardous at times.
However, the Clinton announcement of the reset 
button and the Obama-Medvedev handshake at the 
signing of the Start Treaty were moments of immense 
professional fulfillment for me. From early on, I had
been arguing against the Bush-Cheney confrontational 
decision-making on several issues ranging from NATO's 
eastward expansion to include Ukraine and Georgia in 
NATO and the placing of nuclear units in Poland and 
the Czech Republic to ward off an enemy missile attack. 
The Russian leadership regarded the former as placing 
western military outposts in Russia's backyard and 
the latter as a revival of cold war confrontation. These 
initiatives have now gone into moratorium.
Starting in 1968, I began analyzing the policy 
twists and turns in the former Soviet Union by sifting 
the evidence and applying the analytical tools of the 
economics discipline rather than letting myself be 
swayed by ideological preconceptions or emotional 
predisposition. This approach clearly violates the 
stricture laid down by the nineteenth-century Russian 
poet Fyodor Tyutchev in his four-line lyric which has 
become a celebrated invocation about how one might 
understand Russia.
Ymo m Poccuro He noHOTB...
B Poccuro MO’/KHO TOHBKO BepUTB.
“Russia cannot be grasped with the mind.... One can 
only believe in Russia.” On my part, I have sought to 
understand Russia on the basis of a challenging and 
rewarding intellectual engagement.
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